Verification in North Korea

North Korea is allowing IAEA inspectors into their country to verify Yongbyon's shutdown, in return for whatever we are this time offering NK in return for their this time shutting down their nuclear program. And then next time we will offer something else in return for the next time NK starts up and then stops its nuclear program. It's a long-term cyclical approach to the US appeasing North Korea.

Some people, at Danger Room for example, are more optimistic than I am that North Korea can actually be forever deterred, and further that we should be so confident of this that we can continue our own program of arms control at a full clip.

Trouble with the CTBT is that I'm not entirely certain the US should commit itself to forever refraining from testing nukes. Because we don't know what types of weapons we might want to test in the future, we shouldn't ratify a treaty in the probably vain hope that other, hostile, countries will sign and ratify it in good-faith. The reason, in the first place, that we are concerned about North Korea or Iran possessing nuclear weapons is because we can't trust them. (We're not worried that France, for example, has nuclear weapons, because France can be trusted not to use them against us.) Therefore, if we can't trust North Korea to possess nuclear weapons, on what basis can we trust North Korea if it says it will hold up its end of any bargain or treaty?

The US shouldn't tie its hands in the hope that North Korea will tie its own. Because North Korea has seemingly finally halted its illegal nuclear program is no reason to start trusting them, and its no reason for the US to ratify the CTBT.